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Abstract  
Various research has concluded that economic life did not die out during the conflict in 
Sierra Leone, but took on different forms. Different stakeholders at all levels were engaged 
in economic activities during the war. The specific roles of women in the shadow economy 
are under-researched with the result that most analysis and policy-options are inadequate. 
While some of Sierra Leone’s Market Women strategically participated in war economies to 
‘do well out of war’, most did so out of the need to survive. With the end of the war, 
market women have been able to make a successful transformation to peace economies 
through micro-credit assistance.  
 
Introduction 
It has been interesting to note the excitement research on war economies 
has generated. Less so are donor responses and policy options. One under-
theorised aspect within this area however is the role of women in war 
economies, notably African women. African women, Sierra Leonean women 
in this instance, have generally been portrayed as hapless victims.  But the 
reality is that some of these women profiteered from the conflict. Although 
their role is known anecdotally, scholarship regarding their experience is 
scanty. Despite the fact that women are active participants in war 
economies, conceptualised descriptions and analytical studies about their 
positive transformations are still scarce. One reason for this invisibility is 
that, among other things, grassroots groups seldom document their 
experiences, and when they do, the circulation and publication of their 
work is often outside mainstream circles.  
 
This work must not be viewed merely as a call for a gender perspective of 
war economies. Rather, this paper is an acknowledgement and recognition 
of the multiple roles of women in the Sierra Leone conflict and their 
contributions towards peacebuilding. 
War economies are broadly defined as “a system of producing, mobilising  
and allocating resources to sustain the violence”.1 But in another more 
                                                        
This paper is based on my experiences and work with civil society groups in Sierra Leone 
that spans almost a decade. From 1998-2001, I worked directly with the Sierra Leone 
Market Women Association, strengthening their capacities in human rights, democratic 
governance and women’s political participation. Recently, I conducted research in Sierra 
Leone from February-May on civil society and security in the Mano River Basin and 
conducted several interviews/meetings with the membership.  
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challenging definition, war economies can refer to the degeneration of an 
undeveloped economic system that can be exacerbated by the presence of 
violent conflicts.2 Conflict breeds war economies and war economies feed 
on conflict. Based on my personal experiences in Sierra Leone before, 
during and after the conflict, I claim that the economies share striking 
similarities including patronage, bribery, prebendary politics, kickbacks, and 
that the war economy predates the war. One major difference is the specific 
circumstance of each era. In peace times the buzzword was ‘widespread 
corruption’ that thrived and was a causative factor of the war.3 The post-
conflict era is experiencing the continuation of ‘endemic’ corrupt practices 
from the pre-conflict period that metamorphosed during the conflict under 
extenuating circumstances.  
 
The observations presented here are three fold: first, an inclusive analysis 
of Sierra Leone clearly shows that weak judicial, financial, fiscal, 
administrative and regulatory capacities of the state hastened that country’s 
descent into war. Second, the classification of ‘combat’, ‘shadow’ and 
‘coping’ economies reflect the undeveloped economy of Sierra Leone in 
peace times that mutated in a different (conflict) environment. Research 
has shown that even in peace times some market women were involved in 
cross-border smuggling which had negative impacts on the formal economy 
and during the war these impacts were more noticeable. Moreover, market 
women, as a distinct set of actors, straddle all three categories and cannot 
be classified under one. Third, I argue that non-state micro-credit has 
proven an effective measure to enable market women to participate in 
peace economies. Normally, attention is focussed on government initiatives 
of micro lending. Here, the focus is on non-state schemes.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
1 Le Billion, P. (2000) The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know. ODI 
Relief and Rehabilitation Network: 33. 
2 Author’s own. 
3 I use the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘war’ interchangeably but they have the same meaning; that 
of a violent conflict. 
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Sierra Leone: A Crisis of Governance, Insecurity and Violent 
Conflict 
Sierra Leone, as a state, is an alien creation. Structurally, this new creation 
was socially amorphous with the colonial structures imposed on the new 
groups, but not displacing the multifarious socio-cultural economic and 
political institutions of indigenous Africa. This resulted in a weak state, in 
part because it was not endowed with a widely accepted coherent idea of 
the state among its citizens, a crucial element of the state. Particularly 
burdensome was the absence of a constructive political culture.4 Owing to 
the manner in which the whole decolonisation process was carried out, the 
emergent nation state was bound to fail from the start. The political 
inheritance of the Sierra Leone state at independence was an authoritarian 
structure of the colonial state and accompanying political culture. Sierra 
Leone’s history of autocracy and political instability, for example, has 
begotten a society highly polarised on the basis of class, ethnicity and 
geography, with a small group of urban-based elites completely dominating 
the country’s social, economic and political institutions, reducing both the 
urban poor and the demographically dominant rural population to the 
position of second class citizenship.  
 
State society relations  
The nature of domestic politics in Sierra Leone has been based on patron-
clientelistic system of governance driven by informal networks through 
which state resources are appropriated to support and consolidate regimes 
in power and their followers. Political clientelism, as a system of 
governance in Sierra Leone, is a more or less personalized, affective and 
reciprocal relationship where state resources that could have been 
committed to broad scale development are used to build and expand 
personal rule through the discretionary distribution of private favours and 
the development of clientelistic ties to key individuals and groups.5 This 
                                                        
4 W. Tordoff (1997) Government and Politics in Africa. London, Macmillan 3rd Edition.  
5 R. Lemarchand and K. Legg (1972) “Political Clientelism and Development,” Comparative 
Politics 4.2: 151. 
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relationship between political patrons and their clients assumed a class form 
in which the political elites remained dominant and more privileged. 
 
Domestic politics was characterized by co-optation, clientelism and 
patronage systems instituted by the All People’s Congress (APC) in Sierra 
Leone. The political systems were highly centralised, accompanied by 
institutionalised corruption and politicisation of identity. Overcentralisation 
of political authority led to inequitable resource allocation of the nations’ 
resources and increasing pauperisation of the majority of citizenry.6 
Political parties were and are loose alliances based on factional groupings 
rather than ideological orientation. The need for regime survival fostered an 
inefficient, unaccountable and repressive political system that has been 
difficult to reform as well as use of the security apparatus for maintaining 
structural inequities. Perhaps the group hardest hit was the youth, whose 
‘lumpenisation’ made them easy game for party operations, political 
recruitment into the army and eventually as combatants for the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other warring factions.  
 
Socio-economic dimensions  
Early post-independence growth in the economy, while still externally 
dependent, was nevertheless a source of hope and optimism. Sierra Leone’s 
economy is extractive based. Agriculture is the largest economic sector but 
it has recorded a weak growth rate. The light manufacturing sector is 
undeveloped, accounting for less than 5 per cent of national incomes. 
Reliance on the mining industry has led Sierra Leone to neglect its 
agricultural and light manufacturing bases. Like most other African states, 
Sierra Leone has long been influenced by the processes of globalisation. The 
country is overly dependent on extremely volatile international markets and 
a sharp and sustained deterioration in global conditions is reflected in its 
economy. To cope with the reduction in economic production and lack of 
                                                        
6 J. Cartwright  (1970) Politics in Sierra Leone: 1947-67.  Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press; C.P. Foray (1988) “The Road to One-Party State: The Sierra Leone Experience.” 
Africanus Horton Memorial Lecture delivered at the Centre of African Studies, University of 
Edinburgh, 9 September. Himself a member of the APC then, Foray provides insights on the 
internal workings of the party. 
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investment capital in the mid 1980s, Sierra Leone was forced to increase 
external borrowing and, consequently debt accumulation. This debt, and 
the need to ensure repayment, forced Sierra Leone to implement strict 
economic conditions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank’s 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). SAPs did not generate economic 
growth and development. Instead they considerably accentuated poverty 
and human insecurities as they affected food prices, education costs, 
employment, health care and infrastructural development and also 
weakened the political economy and fiscal sovereignty of these states. 
Women were mostly affected and were forced to resort in many cases to 
petty trading to sustain their families. Sierra Leone is richly endowed with 
strategic resources, such as bauxite, gold, diamond, iron ore, rubber, 
bauxite, arable land, as well as marine, fishery forestry and water 
resources. Despite this immense wealth, the human development and social 
indicators are about the worst in the world. It was ranked bottom at the 
2004 UNDP global Human Development Report and also classified as a 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country. 
 
The socio-economic environment of Sierra Leone had a significant effect on 
the people and contributed to the outbreak of the conflict. As economic and 
social conditions have steadily worsened, so insecurity and instability have 
increased. Physical infrastructure has crumbled, public services have broken 
down, and at the same time, unemployment has escalated. A dramatic 
reduction in agricultural output is but one factor that illustrates economic 
failure. Industrialisation efforts have been hindered by a lack of 
technological development and manufacturing expertise and sound fiscal 
policies, forcing them to depend heavily on foreign income. Economic 
performance in the 1980s was disastrous, reflected in declining state 
revenues and GDP growth rates (from nearly 4 per cent post-independence 
to a slower rate of 1.5 per cent in the 1970s in Sierra Leone)7 Unfavourable 
world price trends for iron ore and bauxite, dwindling export earnings and 
                                                        
7The World Bank Group: Sierra Leone: 1980-2000. Retrieved on 3 August 2003 from 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata.html 
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increasing imports increased indebtedness and drove the country into an 
economic crisis.  
 
The clientelistic and neo-patrimonial politics in Sierra Leone has produced 
unbridled corruption, exploitation, illegitimacy and inefficiency. The 
informalisation of the state has progressively weakened the political, legal 
and economic governing institutions of the ‘official state’, which has been 
subverted to serve the vested interests of the ruling elites who control the 
“shadow state.”8 The armed conflict is therefore a result of long political 
decline with oppressive governments, declining economies due to 
corruption, asset stripping and inept governments based on patronage and 
authoritarian hegemonic rule. 
 
Market Women in Sierra Leone 
Women have the double burden of being women and being poor in Sierra 
Leone.  Lack of accessibility to land and other assets are the major 
constraints along with lack of credit availability.  Among the majority of 
rural and low-income urban women dwellers, market women describe 
themselves as the ‘poorest of the poor’.  They deal mostly in perishable  
foodstuffs at small local daily markets.9  
Many market women are poorly-educated and are unable to speak and write 
English. They are also bound in polygamous marriages and are subordinate in 
most domestic matters. Additionally, the taxation system practised in Sierra 
Leone is equally disempowering. Market women are bound to pay dues on a 
daily basis to mostly male collectors. While fixed rates are levied on male 
stall keepers, on the average it amounts to one percent of their income, 
                                                        
8 W. Reno (1995) Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
9 There are several types of markets in Sierra Leone: small local daily markets, large 
regional markets that meet on specified days in the week. The first deal mostly in 
perishable foodstuffs, and the latter comprise a wider range of goods including European 
and northern imports such as textiles, leatherwork, metal implements, etc. Many families 
have such low incomes that they do not have the means to stock more than 
they actually need from day to day. But shopping in very small quantities is 
even common among better-off families. In a large household it is difficult to 
prevent everything that is purchased from being consumed immediately. 
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market women by contrast pay dues everyday they sell in the marketplace 
amounting to about five percent of their earnings. Refusing to pay a dues 
collector could lead to one space in the market being taken away. 
Notwithstanding, in the bustling market places, the women reign supreme.10 
These tough, assertive women have evolved their own power structure to 
settle all disputes over price and quality, and to select their leadership.  
Even though female traders dominate markets institutions, access to trading 
capital often comes from relatives, parents or husbands, as banks would not 
give them loans. Furthermore, (market) women in Sierra Leone need their 
husbands as guarantor to obtain loans from banking institutions. 
Disputes between members of the same market are normally handled 
internally. However, if the dispute involves market women from two 
different markets, the chairwomen of the two markets intervene. If they 
prove unsuccessful, the case can then be brought to the national President 
of the association. Each market chooses a chairwoman by consensus. 
Through sustained interaction in the market place, a leader emerges by 
proving to be trustworthy and experienced. For the national executive, an 
election is conducted.  
The Sierra Leone Market Women Association: Origins   
The SLMWA was officially established in 1996. Members of the SLMWA 
originally belonged to the Petty Traders Association, the single largest 
organisation representing petty traders and market sellers. Frustrated with 
the discriminatory way they were treated by their male colleagues, a group 
of women left the association to form their own organisation. They 
complained that even though they were all fee-paying members and 
contributed equally to the import of goods from Guinea, they did not 
benefit equally from goods distribution.  
 
Started on a voluntary basis with no full timers and no external resources 
the organization has grown into a registered nationwide non-governmental 
                                                        
10 The market is essentially a female space. Men have distinctive roles such as butchers, 
and the meat trade has traditionally been in the hands of Foulah and men from the north.  
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organisation of around 6,500 women with 5 full time staff and a national 
executive. The most important highlight is that the entire executive is fully 
supported by the people through membership fee and sharing of interest.  
 
Civil war and profiteering 
The war had a direct impact on the livelihood opportunities of market 
women, exacerbated even further by United Nations (UN) sanctions. On 8 
October 1997, the Security Council imposed sanctions against the junta 
regime in Sierra Leone, preventing the sale or supply of petroleum and 
petroleum products, arms and related materiel.11 For Sierra Leoneans 
who did not flee to Guinea the sanction meant that foodstuffs for 
domestic consumption were not readily available in shops or the 
markets. The price for a sack of the staple food, rice, trebled 
overnight, as did all other goods. Black market prices for petrol were 
five times that of the original prices, commercial vehicles in Freetown in 
turn charged passengers exorbitant transport fares, while those who could 
not afford were forced to trek long distances to and from their daily 
activities, or simply stayed at home 
 
Some market women12 seized advantage of this vacuum to engage in cross-
border smuggling from Guinea to Freetown transporting goods such as rice, 
onions, tomatoes and petroleum. They travelled either by road or by sea to 
Guinea where they bought the goods they needed.13 These were then 
smuggled onboard boats to Big Wharf (Freetown), well-hidden underneath 
coverings. The women collaborated with border police and customs officials 
in both countries, enabling them to conduct their business. According to 
                                                        
11 UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) also imposed travel restrictions on members 
of the AFRC junta and adult members of their families. Military equipment earmarked for 
the exclusive use of ECOMOG and humanitarian assistance items were exempted from the 
embargo. 
12 Market women I met and interviewed during my research trip in 2005 were concerned 
that dissemination of this paper would tarnish their reputations as upstanding citizens. 
They therefore requested that I point out that not all market women were involved in 
cross-border smuggling and that only a minimal number were involved in illicit trading with 
the rebels. It is difficult to know exactly how many market women were involved in the war 
economy as yet, research has not been conducted in this area.  
13 By sea was the preferred mode of transportation as boats could take more goods. 
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interviews conducted, security officers at the customs checkpoint at Big 
Wharf were bribed and the goods were offloaded and transferred to 
designated stores. Foodstuffs meant for the Freetown markets were retailed 
among other market women. Rice, for instance, was distributed in small 
quantities (five sacks each) and the rest was kept hidden. The retailers in 
turn emptied the sacks and sold the rice by cups (one cup was sold for 
Le500) as selling per cup yielded more profit. A 20 kg sack of rice at that 
time cost Le50, 000 or Le60, 000.  Smuggling was a low cost  and high risk 
enterprise for market women. Costs of smuggling were low in part, because 
the infrastructure to apprehend smugglers was weak, unreliable, or non-
existent and risks high.  
 
Market women profiteers were also engaged in a thriving trade with rebels. 
Foodstuffs and petrol were smuggled from ‘safe’ stores in Freetown to 
rebel-held areas in the provinces, on board trailers or big trucks, and sold to 
rebel commanders. In turn, they were either paid in cash (Leones or Dollars) 
or in kind, including jewellery, gold or diamonds. Back in Freetown, market 
women either sold their diamonds to Lebanese diamond dealers or smuggled 
the gems across the border to Guinea where they fetched higher prices 
enabling them to buy more foodstuffs. And so the cycle continued. 
 
Trading with rebels was a risky enterprise. For some market women it was a 
risk worth taking, for others it resulted in their deaths. Some died in 
gruesome road accidents on their way to the provinces never making it to 
their destinations. Others were ambushed on their way back to Freetown by 
the same rebels they had earlier traded with.  Sometimes their ‘customers’ 
would send their ‘boys’ after them after they had concluded their 
transactions, to retrieve the money and/or valuables the women had earlier 
received as payments.  
 
This account clearly shows that some market women, as well as 
participating in ‘coping’ economy also befitted from business transactions 
with rebels in the ‘shadow’ economy. In addition, I would argue that their 
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economic interactions with the security forces on both sides of the border, 
including documented accounts of smuggling of small arms and light 
weapons-for cash  would allow their inclusion in the ‘combat’ economy.14  
 
Making the change with Micro-credit  
At the end of the war in Sierra Leone, the livelihoods of most market 
women were destroyed. With the support of Campaign for Good Governance 
(CGG), a national non-governmental organisation (NGO) that had provided 
them with numerous financial and technical assistance, a recovery plan was 
developed. This entailed a micro-credit revolving loan scheme to enable the 
(market) women to re-start trading and production activities, thus creating 
a favourable condition for them to shake off poverty.  
 
Today micro-credit, or small loans to the poor for the purpose of promoting 
small-scale enterprises, has become the fashionable word with the World 
Bank, governments and development practitioners and is seen as effective 
poverty alleviation mechanisms for poor women. Such claims have been 
advanced on the grounds that micro-credit can not only generate financially 
sustainable lending institutions for poverty alleviation, but also facilitate 
institutional relations necessary for empowerment of women. While this 
may not always be the case in other contexts, micro-credit played a 
significant role in rebuilding the lives of market women in Sierra Leone and 
kick-starting their livelihoods.  
 
In 2000, taking advantage of a grant of US$50,000 by the UK Department for 
International Development (DfID), the SLMWA introduced micro credit 
schemes to increase the livelihoods of their membership. The project was 
launched by the then Minister for DfID, Claire Short, in Freetown in one of 
Freetown’s central markets.  
 
The SLMWA enjoys a unique advantageous position to involve itself in the 
                                                        
14 The media in Sierra Leone was full of stories of market women caught smuggling small 
arms and other weapons for rebels. The weapons were invariably hidden among their 
foodstuffs.   
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micro credit scheme as it is basically a grass-root organization closely 
connected to women and households. From 2000 to 2003, the scheme was 
run quite successfully as evidenced by the wide access of market women to 
the credit support (90 percent of the credit funds was used to help the 
women), the high success ratio of projects (about 70 percent of micro credit 
recipients benefited from the support) and high ratio of loan recovery 
(nearly 80 percent of the loans were recovered except for situations of 
serious emergencies). 
 
The SLMWA’s policy was to offer micro loans of about Le100, 000 (ca. $45) to 
each of the women in groups of 20-30 borrowers from the 26 markets in 
Freetown respectively. The local chairlady oversaw the compliance with the 
rules. The maximum loan was Le300, 000, paid out to ‘big’ market sellers 
such as rice dealers, palm oil and fish sellers. The loans were repayable on a 
daily basis at a rate of Le100 every day (about 2 cents). The SLMWA’s initial 
interest rate was five percent, which is generally considered realistic in 
commercial terms. This was later increased to ten percent to cover office 
and administration costs and was deducted upfront.  
 
A professional accountant was employed to manage the financial aspects of 
the programme and he was supported by a cashier and three collectors.15 
Beyond this, the Gender Department of CGG provided administration 
support. Group pressure and hard work ensured repayment of the initial 
loans which were then followed by others. The system proved to be very 
successful with some women even repaying their loans before they were 
due, leading to a repayment rate of 70 per cent. Moreover, a savings scheme 
was introduced for lenders. Each lender was encouraged to save an 
additional Le100 a day. This money and interest accrued from the scheme 
were used to buy yearly Treasury Bearer Bonds.   
 
Based on the Freetown experience, micro-credit was extended to market 
                                                        
15 It was the responsibility of the three collectors, working in the east, west and central 
areas of Freetown respectively, to ‘collect’ the daily payment from borrowers in the 
markets.  
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women in six more districts, in Bonthe, Bo, Kono, Makeni Kabala and Kambia 
districts. 
 
Panacea or delusion 
The SLMWA’s objectives include creating self-employment opportunities for 
its membership by providing them with low income. Its loans have increased 
the employment of female borrowers in such activities as second-hand 
clothing retailing and gara tie-dying. This in turn has provided employment 
to members of the borrower's immediate families. Thus the credit 
programme had a multiplier effect that contributes to national development 
goals of creating economic self-sufficiency and improving the standard of 
living.  
 
The micro credit scheme has also transformed the perceptions of the 
women about themselves and contributed to their improved understanding 
of self-development. The scheme has generated training opportunities for 
the SLMWA to increase their production knowledge and skills and strengthen 
their perceptions about market competition.  Apart from the above-
mentioned economic gains, micro credit has also benefited women on the 
political front. It has improved participation of women in the rural areas in 
local political organizations which have helped awaken their sense of 
involvement in the economic reconstruction of their communities.   
 
Experience with the market women has shown that although micro-credit 
has helped them women to become more economically independent, self- 
sufficient and more assertive, there has been little change in other areas. 
Two of these important areas are the division of labour among women and 
men in the household for the provision of income and distribution of 
household tasks. Market women continue to be the ones that ensure the 
survival of the family and/or the ones who ensure that the basic needs of 
the family are met. And, although most of the women who participated in 
micro-credit experiences are successful entrepreneurs, they continue to do 
all the domestic work at home.  
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 The above account has demonstrated that self-reliant women's organisations 
can be built with people's support and they can help to empower women if 
planned properly. It has also shown that Government’s support is not critical 
to this process. 
 
Micro-credit schemes in Sierra Leone were an innovation from the voluntary 
and NGO sector. But like so many 
other innovations it was hijacked by the political elites to serve their 
narrow interests. The problem today is the Government's large scale entry 
into micro lending schemes. Through schemes like the Micro-Finance 
Programme (MFP), the Social Action for Poverty Alleviation (SAPA) of the 
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) the government paid out 
billions of Leones as micro-credit loans to paramount chiefs and other 
traditional leaders around the country. Normally this would not have been 
questioned but the fact that it happened during the elections period raised 
doubts about government’s motives.16 Government’s interest rate is 15% and 
the recovery rate of these loans have not been disclosed but 89 percent has 
been widely touted by government officials.17
   
When government agencies start to offer credit, whatever their motivation 
and whatever the articulation in policy papers, the concern at the ground 
level is how to confine the groups to only credit issue and how to keep it 
from growing into a centre to ensure regime survival.  
 
Conclusion 
War economies is a complex subject that cannot be straightjacketed to fit 
preconceived notions. I continue to argue that the nature and extent of 
corruption in pre-conflict Sierra Leone was a crucial determinant of the 
                                                        
16 Government was criticised and accused of wasting much-needed resources on elections 
campaigning which afforded the ruling party an unfair advantage over other contesting 
parties.   
17 It is alleged that recipients refused to repay the loan, arguing that it was ‘government’s 
money’. This had a knock on effect on the SLMWA’s scheme as some of its borrowers 
pointed out that if government was not actively seeking repayment from its borrowers, 
then the SLMWA should bestow the same favours on them. 
 14
various economic activities that unfolded during the war. And these were 
not gender-neutral. Market women’s engagement in this grey area was both 
a cause and a consequence of the extenuating circumstances at that time. 
The desire to re-engage in legitimate economic activities proved to be 
successful with the micro-credit scheme.   
 
In this context, the scheme led to micro-solutions. This is not to say that 
micro-credit can not play a valuable role in poverty alleviation. But it must 
not be seen as a blueprint to eradicate poverty in developing countries in 
Africa, but as one development strategy that can be combined with a range 
of other options, based on local conditions and needs.  
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